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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
!•

Does a trustee under a deed of trust satisfy its

duty of care to the beneficiary when it executes and records a
deed of reconveyance of the trust property in good faith
reliance on an acknowledged request for reconveyance?
2.

Does a trustee under a deed of trust owe the

beneficiary any duty to foresee that an acknowledged request
for reconveyance of the trust property is a forgery?
PERTINENT STATUTE
Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-33 (1953) Satisfaction of obligation
secured by trust deed—Reconveyance of trust property.
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The reconveyance may
designate the grantee therein as "the person or persons
entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed shall
deliver to the trustor or his successor in interest the trust
deed and the note or other evidence of the obligation so
satisfied. Any beneficiary under such trust deed who refuses
to request a reconveyance from the trustee for a period of
thirty days after written demand therefor is made by the
trustor or his successor in interest shall be liable to the
trustor or his successor in interest, as the case may be, for
double damages resulting from such refusal, or such trustor or
his successor in interest may bring an action against the
beneficiary and trustee to compel a reconveyance of the trust
property and in such action the judgment of the court shall be
that the trustee reconvey the trust property and that the
beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor in interest,
as the case may be, the costs of suit including a reasonable
attorney's fee and all damages resulting from the refusal of
the beneficiary to request a reconveyance as hereinabove
provided.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case is before this court on plaintiffs appeal
from the trial court's summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's
Complaint against Guardian Title Company of Utah and Warren H.
Curlis.

The Memorandum Decision granting the motion of

Guardian and Curlis was signed by the Honorable David E. Roth
on October 21, 1985.

R. at 520-2.

Decision is attached as Addendum I.
was entered on March 17, 1986.

A copy of the Memorandum
The trial court's judgment

R. at 589-90.

This appeal has been consolidated with Case No.
860156, another appeal from the same trial court proceeding.
Case No. 860156 is an appeal by Randy Krantz, B. Brad
Christenson, and Debra Christenson, from a judgment entered
against them in favor of plaintiff on February 14, 1986.

R. at

554-5.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about July 1, 1980, defendants Randy Krantz

and B. Brad Christenson purchased from plaintiff a piece of
real property located in Helper, Utah,
2.
plaintiff.

R. at 384, 434-5.

The sale of the property was financed in part by
Defendants Randy Krantz, B. Brad Christensen,

Debra S. Christenson and R & C Associates ("R & C") executed a
promissory note in favor of plaintiff and her mother, Eva

-2-

Robertson, in the amount of $61,800, R. at 1, 384-5, 434. A
copy of the promissory note is attached as Addendum II.
3.

To secure plaintiff's loan, R & C pledged certain

real property it owned, located in Weber County, as
collateral.
4.

R. at 385, 435.
The lien created in favor of plaintiff is

evidenced by a deed of trust naming R & C Associates as trustor
and plaintiff and Eva Robertson as beneficiaries.
435.

R. at 385,

A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Addendum III.
5.

Eva Robertson, who is plaintiffs mother, has

assigned to plaintiff her interest in both the promissory note
and the trust deed.
6.

R. at 385, 435.

Guardian Title Company acted as trustee under the

deed of trust.

It played no other role in the transaction.

R.

at 385, 435.
7.

On or about December 18, 1980, Guardian, as

trustee, received a written, acknowledged Request for Full
Reconveyance of the property subject to the trust deed,
apparently signed by plaintiff and Eva Robertson.
436.

R. at 385,

A copy of the Request for Full Reconveyance is attached

as Addendum IV.
8.

Upon receiving the acknowledged Request for

Reconveyance, Guardian complied with the request by executing

-3-

and recording a Deed of Reconveyance of the property subject to
the deed of trust.

The Deed of Reconveyance was executed by

Guardian's President, Warren H. Curlis.

R. at 386, 436. A

copy of the Deed of Reconveyance is attached as Addendum V.
9.

The Request for Full Reconveyance states that the

debt secured by the deed of trust "has been fully paid and
satisfied . . . ."
10.

R. at 404; Addendum IV.

Guardian took no further steps to ascertain

whether plaintiff, the beneficiary under the deed of trust, had
been paid, prior to executing and recording the Deed of
Reconveyance, other than to ascertain that the Request for Full
Reconveyance was properly acknowledged.

R. at 386, 436-7;

Curlis Deposition, pp. 40, 42-3.
11.

Guardian acted in good faith in executing and

recording the deed of reconveyance in reliance upon the
acknowledged request for reconveyance.

There is no claim or

evidence whatsoever of any improper motive on Guardian's part
in this case.
12.

R. at 386; Wycalis Deposition, p. 92.
Plaintiff alleges that the request for

reconveyance was a forgery and that neither she nor Eva
Robertson signed it.

R. at 386, 437; Wycalis Deposition,

pp. 81-2. Guardian assumed, for purposes of its motion for
summary judgment below, R. at 386, and assumes for purposes of

-4-

this appeal only, that the request for reconveyance was a
forgery.
13.

Over the years Guardian has, in the capacity of

trustee under deeds of trust, executed literally hundreds of
deeds of reconveyance based on written requests for
reconveyance.

Except for the instance alleged in this lawsuit,

Guardian knows of no other request for reconveyance submitted
to it that has been forged.
14.

R. at 386-7, 399-40.

When the deed of reconveyance was recorded by

Guardian, plaintiff lost the benefit of the real property
collateral securing her loan to defendants Krantz and the
Christensons.
15.

R. at 387, 436.
After the deed of reconveyance was recorded, a

process virtually identical to that described above occurred
again:

plaintiff became the beneficiary under another deed of

trust, describing a different piece of property, under which
Guardian was also the trustee.

After this deed of trust had

been recorded, Guardian received another acknowledged request
for reconveyance of the property subject to this trust deed,
which also had apparently been signed by plaintiff and Eva
Robertson.

Guardian accordingly executed and recorded a deed

of reconveyance of this property, as it had done in response to
the first acknowledged request.

-5-

R. at 437-8.

However,

plaintiff claims she had no knowledge of events relating to the
later trust deed.

R. at 438.

Further, plaintiff "does not

have, nor does she claim, any interest in the substituted
security."

Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This appeal arises from plaintiffs suit to collect on
a promissory note.

In the court below, plaintiff obtained

judgment against three of the co-makers of the note, Randy
Krantz, B. Brad Christenson, and Debra S. Christensen.

Those

defendants have appealed that judgment to this court in Case
No. 860156, which has been consolidated with this appeal.
The promissory note was secured by real property
described in a deed of trust, under which plaintiff was the
beneficiary.

Guardian Title Company, respondent herein, was

the trustee under the deed of trust.
Several months after the deed of trust had been
recorded, Guardian received a written, acknowledged request for
reconveyance of the trust property.

Upon receiving the

request, Guardian performed its statutory duty by executing and
recording a deed of reconveyance of the property.

Plaintiff

claims that the request for reconveyance which Guardian acted
upon was a forgery.

Nonetheless, as a result of the

recordation of the deed of reconveyance, plaintiff lost her

-6-

lien against the real property collateral.

Plaintiff brought

suit against Guardian, claiming it had acted negligently in
reconveying the trust property, and should therefore be held
liable to her for the amount due on the promissory note.
In the court below, Guardian sought and was granted
summary judgment dismissing it from the case.

Its arguments on

this appeal, to support affirmance of the trial court's
judgment, are the same arguments it presented in support of its
motion below.
On her appeal, plaintiff significantly does not
contend that the case should be remanded for the trial of
material issues of fact.

Instead, she contends that the trial

court's judgment should be reversed, that is, that Guardian
should be held liable to her as a matter of law.
Plaintiff has wholly failed to show her entitlement to
such extradordinary relief.

First of all, Guardian owed no

legal duty to protect plaintiff from the consequences of a
deliberate criminal act - a forgery, as she alleges - which
resulted in reconveyance of the trust property.

Second, even

assuming such a legal duty was owed, Guardian satisfied that
duty as a matter of law by acting, as the trial court held, in
good faith reliance upon a request for reconveyance

-7-

of the trust property which had been properly acknowledged
under Utah law.
In support of her position on appeal, plaintiff
reiterates many of the arguments she advanced below.

In

addition, she sets forth numerous arguments that were not
presented to the trial court.

These arguments should not be

considered by this court for the first time on appeal.
Plaintiff's request for reversal of the judgment below
in this case is extraordinary because, as we will demonstrate,
she points to no evidence in the record to demonstrate that
Guardian, by acting as it did, failed to satisfy its duty to
plaintiff.

Furthermore, her Brief contains no legal authority

whatsoever holding that Guardian, by reconveying based on an
acknowledged request for reconveyance, failed to satisfy the
duties of a trustee.
As demonstrated below, the trial court's judgment was
clearly correct, and should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT.
A*

What This Case Is About.

This case involves the familiar device used in the
State of Utah to secure obligations with real property—the
deed of trust.

The trust deed security mechanism is created by

-8-

Utah Code Ann, §§ 57-1-19 to 36 (1953), which authorizes a
three-party arrangement involving a trustor, a beneficiary, and
a trustee.

Under this arrangement, the trustor executes a deed

of trust in favor of the trustee, who then holds the property
in trust for the beneficiary, who ordinarily has extended
credit to the trustor.

The effect of this arrangement is for

the trustor to convey his real property as security for the
debt owed to the beneficiary.
In the event the debt secured by the trust property is
not paid, the trustee is empowered to sell the property to
satisfy the debt.

Saa Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-23 to 32 (1953).

If, on the other hand, the debt secured by the deed of
trust is paid, the trustee, upon written request from the
beneficiary, must "reconvey" the trust property to the
trustor.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1953).

Recordation of a

deed of reconveyance executed by the trustee extinguishes the
beneficiary* s lien.
This case specifically involves the mechanism for
effecting a reconveyance of property subject to a trust deed,
and raises the issue whether a trustee under a deed of trust
may rely, with impunity, on an acknowledged request for
reconveyance in executing and recording a deed of reconveyance
of the trust property.

-9-

The operative facts are straight-forward and are not
in dispute.

Defendant Guardian was named as trustee under a

deed of trust.

Plaintiff was the beneficiary.

Several months

after the trust deed was recorded. Guardian received a request
for reconveyance, appearing to carry the signature of the
beneficiaries:

plaintiff, and her mother, Eva Robertson.

The request for reconveyance had been properly acknowledged in
accordance with Utah law.

See Addendum IV; Utah Code Ann.

§§ 57-2-1 et sea. (1953).
In reliance on the acknowledged request, Guardian,
through its President Warren H. Curlis, who is also a
defendant, executed and recorded a deed of reconveyance.
(Guardian and Curlis are referred to hereafter collectively as
"Guardian.")

Guardian relied exclusively on the acknowledged

request, which states that the debt owed plaintiff "has been
fully paid and satisfied," in acting as it did.

It took no

further steps to ascertain whether plaintiff had been paid.
The effect of Guardian's conduct was to divest plaintiff of her
lien against the property.

1

Although Eva Robertson was one of the
beneficiaries under the deed of trust, she has assigned her
interest in the trust deed to plaintiff.
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Several months later, when the co-makers of
2
plaintiffs promissory note defaulted,

plaintiff claims she

first learned that the trust property had been reconveyed.

She

claims she never signed the request for reconveyance, does not
know who did, and that it is a forgery. 3
Thereafter, plaintiff brought this suit against
Guardian, claiming it acted negligently in reconveying the
trust property and was therefore liable for the amount of
plaintiff's debt.
B.

The Ruling Below.

After completing its discovery, Guardian moved for
summary judgment, arguing:
1.

Assuming the request for reconveyance was a

forgery, Guardian nonetheless owed no legal duty to protect
plaintiff from this unforeseeable criminal act; and
2.

Guardian was entitled, as a matter of law,

to rely on the acknowledged request for reconveyance as a basis
for reconveying the trust property.

2

The co-makers are defendants Randy Krantz, B.
Brad Christenson and Debra Christenson. The trial court held
them liable to plaintiff on the promissory note. They have
appealed to this court in Case No. 860156, which is
consolidated with this appeal.
3

Guardian assumed for purposes of its motion for
summary judgment below, and also must assume for purposes of
this appeal, that the request was in fact a forgery.
-11-

These arguments are set forth in detail below.
To oppose Guardian's motion, plaintiff did not attempt
to show the existence of a factual issue which precluded
granting summary judgment.

Plaintiff conceded that no material

issues of fact were in dispute.

R. at 433-9; 471-2; 520.

Instead, plaintiff responded by arguing, in substance,
that because the request for reconveyance was, in her view,
"unauthorized", see R. at 442-4, Guardian should be held liable
to plaintiff as a matter of law.

In effect, plaintiff's

position below was that, based on the undisputed facts,
plaintiff was entitled to judgment against Guardian.
Guardian's motion was decided without oral argument,
4
based on the memoranda submitted.
After reviewing the
parties' arguments, the court ruled as follows:
The Court finds that Utah cases and
Rules of Evidence, which give great weight
to acknowledged documents, compel a ruling
that, in a case such as this, a trustee is
not negligent in relying on an acknowledged
request to reconvey property unless the
trustee has reason to believe the request is
forged. No evidence has been presented to

4

The memoranda submitted on Guardian's motion,
which contain all the arguments made below on the issues now
before this court, are contained in the Record as follows:
Guardian's Initial Memorandum, R. at 381-405; Plaintiff's
Responsive Memorandum, R. at 433-47; Guardian's Reply
Memorandum, R. at 471-5.
-12-

suggest that the trustee should have been
suspicious of the document; therefore,
defendant's motion for summary judgment is
granted.
R. at 521-2; Addendum I, pp. 2-3.
C.

Plaintiff's Position on Appeal.

On this appeal, plaintiff does not contend that a
material issue of fact exists to preclude the summary judgment
appealed from.

Of course, plaintiff could not take this

position now, since she failed to make this argument below.
Bundv v. Century Equipment Company, Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758
(Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.,
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
Instead, plaintiff argues that, based on the record
before this court, the judgment below should be reversed—that
Guardian should be held liable to plaintiff as a matter of
law.

Therefore, this is not the more routine case where the

appellant claims summary judgment was improvidently granted,
and the case should be remanded for the trial of factual issues.
In support of her appeal to this court to reverse the
judgment below, plaintiff advances essentially two arguments:
1.

Guardian failed to "know" that the promissory

note had been paid before executing the deed of reconveyance;
and

-13-

2.

Guardian failed to require presentation of the

original note and trust deed before recording the deed of
reconveyance.

These arguments are addressed in detail at

Points IIIA and IIIB below.
Reduced to simplest terms, plaintiff's position on
this appeal is that, although Guardian acted in complete good
faith, and had no reason to suspect a forgery, and although it
relied on an acknowledged request for reconveyance, Guardian
should be held liable to plaintiff as a matter of law.
Incredibly, plaintiff takes this position despite the fact that:
1.

The record is devoid of any evidence to support

any obligation on Guardian's part to satisfy any greater
requirements than it did; and
2.

Plaintiff cites no legal authority whatsoever

holding that Guardian, by relying on an acknowledged request
for reconveyance, failed to satisfy the duties of a trustee.
As set forth in greater detail below, the trial court
properly granted Guardian's motion for summary judgment, and
its judgment should therefore be affirmed.
II.

GUARDIAN SATISFIED ITS DUTY TO PLAINTIFF BY EXECUTING
AND RECORDING THE DEED OF RECONVEYANCE IN GOOD FAITH
RELIANCE ON AN ACKNOWLEDGED REQUEST FOR RECONVEYANCE.
The operative statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33

(1953), imposes only the following requirement on a trustee
-14-

asked to reconvey trust property:
When the obligation secured by any
trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee
shall, upon written request by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property.
Although the statute only requires that the request be in
writing, Guardian requires, as a matter of company policy, that
such requests must in addition be properly acknowledged in
accordance with Utah law.
p. 40.

R. at 397; Curlis Deposition,

That policy was followed in this case.

Thus, Guardian

exceeded the requirements imposed by the statute.

The trial

court found that, in acting as it did, Guardian satisfied its
duty to plaintiff as a matter of law, holding that "a trustee
is not negligent in relying on an acknowledged request to
reconvey property unless the trustee has reason to believe the
request is forged."

R. at 521; Addendum I, p.2.

The trial court's holding is clearly correct.

The

purpose of an acknowledgement is to place a stamp of
authenticity on a document so that parties may thereafter,
without further inquiry, reasonably rely on the document's
genuineness.

In granting Guardian's motion for summary

judgment, the trial court properly recognized that because the
request for reconveyance was properly acknowledged, Guardian
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was entitled to presume the document was authentic, and to act
accordingly.
Utah law declares in many places the reliability that,
as a matter of law, may be presumed from the acknowledgement of
a document.

For example, in Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker Bank &

Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952), the Supreme Court
held that the acknowledgement of a document creates a strong
presumption of its genuineness:
This presumption should not be regarded
lightly, but should be given great weight.
The authorities generally hold that the
effect of such certificate of acknowledgment
will not be overthrown by a mere
preponderance of the evidence, but it must
be clear and convincing.
Accord Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358, 1360
(10th Cir. 1977); Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v. Davis, 611
P.2d 711, 712 (Utah 1980); State ex rel. First Trust & Savings
Bank v. Easlev, 140 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tenn. 1940) ("A
certificate of acknowledgement is an act which must in the
nature of things be relied on with confidence by men of
business.").

State ex rel. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v.

Otto, 276 S.W. 96, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) ("It is well settled
that one is entitled to rely upon a notary certificate and is
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not required to doubt the truth of the certificate and go out
and verify its statement.");
Acknowledged documents not only carry a heavy
presumption of genuineness, they are also self-authenticating
under the Utah Rules of Evidence.

That is, under Rule 902(8)

of the Utah Rules of Evidence, an acknowledged document is,
without any further proof, what it purports to be.

The Notes

of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
from which the new Utah Rules were taken, state that
acknowledged documents, as well as other documents set out in
Rule 902, are admissible without foundational testimony as to
their authenticity "because practical considerations reduce the
possibility of unauthenticity to a very small dimension."
R. Evid. 902 advisory committee notes.

Fed.

The Notes further

state, with specific reference to acknowledged documents, that
"[i]f this authentication suffices for documents of the
importance of those affecting titles, logic scarcely permits
denying this method when other kinds of documents are
involved."

Fed. R. Evid. 902(8) advisory committee notes.

Finally, and significantly, acknowledgement of any
document affecting real estate entitles it to be recorded:
A certificate of the acknowledgement of
any conveyance, or of the proof of the
execution thereof as provided in this title,
-17-

signed and certified by the officer taking
the same as provided in this title, shall
entitle such conveyance, with the
certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be
recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county in which the real estate is
situated.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1953).

In short, under Utah law the

acknowledgement of a document constitutes the indicia of
authenticity that the county recorder is entitled to rely on
before recording a document.
The above authorities demonstrate the great weight
accorded to acknowledged documents under Utah law.

They carry

a presumption of reliability that can be overcome only by clear
and convincing evidence; they may be relied on by judges and
juries as presumptively authentic; and finally, the county
recorder may rely on their genuineness.

Furthermore, people

throughout the real estate industry in this state do and must
rely on the presumptive authenticity of acknowledged documents
for that system to function effectively.

R. at 393.

Certainly this does not mean that acknowledged
documents are infallible.

There is always some possibility

that someone, with the cooperation of an unscrupulous notary
public, will forge a document and then have it acknowledged.
The system is not fool-proof.
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However, Guardian submits that, like a judge admitting
evidence or the county recorder recording a document, it was
entitled as a matter of law to rely on the genuineness of the
request for reconveyance submitted to it.

Indeed, it is

evident that the very purpose of acknowledgements is to permit
parties, such as Guardian, to presume the authenticity of
acknowledged documents without further inquiry into or evidence
of their genuineness.

If Guardian and others like it could not

so rely, the salutary purposes advanced by the acknowledgement
of documents would be completely undermined:
would be rendered meaningless.

acknowledgements

Guardian submits it acted

reasonably in presuming the request was genuine, and fully
satisfied its obligation as a trustee by complying with the
acknowledged request.
III.

PLAINTIFF WHOLLY FAILS TO SHOW WHY GUARDIAN SHOULD BE
HELD LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In her Appellant's Brief, plaintiff proffers

essentially two arguments why, although Guardian acted in good
faith reliance on an acknowledged document, it should
nonetheless be held liable to her as a matter of law.

First,

plaintiff asserts that Guardian could not properly reconvey the
trust property unless it "knew" that plaintiff's debt had been
paid.

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10, 12, 14, 15 and 19.
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Second, plaintiff argues, for the first time on this appeal,
that Guardian should be held liable because it failed to
require surrender of the note and trust deed prior to
reconveying the property.

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 16, 22.

These arguments are addressed in sequence below.
A,

Guardian Completely Satisfied its Duty to "Know"
that Plaintiff's Debt had Been Paid.

Although Plaintiff states repeatedly that Guardian
could not properly reconvey the trust property without first
"knowing" that plaintiff's debt had first been paid, her Brief
is devoid of any analysis of what Guardian, or any other
trustee, should do to acquire this knowledge.

Plaintiff

apparently believes that, in order to avoid liability, the
trustee must "know" with absolute certainty that the
beneficiary's debt has been paid, and if it fails to "know"
this fact, should be held strictly liable to the beneficiary.
To the contrary, however, it is evident that Guardian's legal
duty to "know" the debt has been paid is not absolute, but must
instead be measured by some reasonable standard of care.
There is a wide range of possible steps that Guardian,
or any other trustee, might take to satisfy itself that a
beneficiary's debt has been paid.

At one extreme, Guardian

might require every beneficiary to make an appointment to come
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into its office, present unquestionable identification, and
state under oath that the debt had been paid.

Such a procedure

would obviously impose an incredible administrative burden upon
Guardian and other trustees.

Numerous beneficiaries, having

purchased mortgage paper on the secondary market, would be
required to come in from out-of-town; an inordinate amount of
time and effort would have to be invested in the reconveyance
process.

Not only would such a procedure be highly

impractical, it significantly would not in any sense ensure
that the debt had been paid.

Imposter beneficiaries might come

in to make this oath; true beneficiaries might, for whatever
reason, lie under oath.
At the other end of the spectrum, the trustee might
require only a telephone call in which the caller identifies
himself as the beneficiary, states that the debt had been paid,
and a deed of reconveyance may be executed.

This option would

provide insufficient protection to the beneficiary's interest.
Between the two extremes outlined, there are
incremental gradations of care the trustee might exercise to
reasonably protect the beneficiary's interest.
What should the trustee be required to do to satisfy
itself that the debt has been paid?

As stated above, the

statute only requires that the trustee receive a "written
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request" for reconveyance.

Arguably, such a written request is

all that is required, but that issue is not before the court,
because in this case the request for reconveyance was
acknowledged.

That acknowledged request carries a presumption

of validity that "should be given great weight,"

Northcrest,

Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952)
and states on its face that the "indebtedness secured by said
Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied . . . ."
Point II, supra.

See

Guardian was entitled to rely on this

statement in an acknowledged document, and by virtue of the
request for reconveyance did everything that reasonably ought
to be required to satisfy itself the debt had been paid.
1.

The Introductory Clause of § 57-1-33 Imposes
No Duties on a Trustee.

Plaintiff argues that the introductory clause in the
statute, "[w]hen the obligation secured by any trust deed has
been satisfied," somehow imposes on the trustee a duty to
ensure that the debt has been paid.

Appellant's Brief, p. 12.

This language was not designed to make the trustee an insurer
against non-payment of the debt, however.

If the legislature

intended to impose such an onerous obligation on the trustee,
it certainly could have done so.
It is evident that, rather than imposing any duties
upon the trustee, this language merely describes the sequence
-22-

of events prior to a reconveyance:

After the debt has been

paid, and the trustee receives a written request for
reconveyance, then the trustee must reconvey the trust property.
2.

Plaintiff Cites Neither Evidence Nor Case
Law to Show that Guardian Failed to Satisfy
Its Duty to Plaintiff,

Although plaintiff urges emphatically that the trustee
must "know" the debt has been paid before reconveying, she
presents no evidence whatsoever to support this position.
Beyond plaintiffs naked assertions, there simply is no
evidence in the record that a trustee is required to do
anything beyond what Guardian did in this case to satisfy
itself that the debt is paid.
Likewise, plaintiff sets forth no legal authority
holding that the requirements of a trustee are any greater than
those met by Guardian.

Instead, plaintiff has cited several

cases dealing in a very general way with the fiduciary
obligations of a trustee, which Guardian does not dispute.

In

addition, she has cited several cases in which trustees have
been held liable for improperly reconveying trust property.
However, in every one of those cases the reconveyance at issue
was entirely unauthorized—there simply had been no request for
reconveyance
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at all, and the trustee acted in willful disregard of the
rights of the beneficiary.
For example, in Doyle v. Surety Title & Guaranty Co.,
68 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), one of the chief cases
relied upon by plaintiff, the trustee reconveyed based on a
request for reconveyance made by the trustor.
had made no request at all.

The beneficiary

68 Cal. Rptr. at 179.

Similarly,

in Jeanese, Inc. v. Surety Title & Guaranty Company, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960), the trustee had reconveyed by
mistake, with no request for reconveyance.

In Huffman v.

Gould, 64 N.E.2d 773 (111. App. Ct. 1945), the trustee,
described by the court as "a cheat, a rascal, and a base
scoundrel bent upon defrauding the unsuspecting," 64 N.E.2d at
777, released the trust deed maliciously, with deliberate
disregard for the beneficiary's rights.
These, and the rest of the cases cited by plaintiff,
are obviously a far cry from this one, where Guardian
reconveyed in complete good faith, based on an acknowledged
request for reconveyance.

None of plaintiff's legal

authorities even come close to dealing with the issue before
this court.
In short, plaintiff has pointed to no authority,
either evidentiary or legal, to support her position that
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Guardian was required to do any more than it did in order to
"know" that plaintiffs debt had been paid,
B.

Guardian Had No Obligation to Require Surrender
of the Note and Trust Deed Before Reconvevinq the
Trust Property,

Plaintiff's second principal argument on appeal is
that Guardian was obligated, before it could properly reconvey,
to require the beneficiary to surrender to it the original note
and trust deed.
1.

This Argument Should Not Be Considered on
Appeal Because Plaintiff Failed to Raise It
Below.

Plaintiff failed to raise this argument in the trial
court.

Although she does mention this point in her Memorandum,
in a one-sentence reference,5 she nowhere discusses what

pertinence it may have.

The trial court lists plaintiff's

arguments in its Memorandum Decision, R. at 520-1; Addendum I,
pp. 1 and 2, but does not list this as one of the points she
has argued.

Plaintiff's mere mention of this fact in passing,

without arguing its significance to the trial court, is
inadequate to raise the issue before the court below.
Therefore, this argument should not be considered for the first

5

Out of the blue, plaintiff states at page 12 of
her Memorandum below: "Nor did defendant require delivery of
the original notes and trust deed . . . ." R. at 444.
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time on this appeal.

Bundy v. Century Equipment Company, Inc.;

692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire
Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
2.

Plaintiff Again Cites No Evidence Or Case
Law to Show Guardian Should Have Required
Surrender of the Original Note and Trust
Deed.

Even assuming this argument was properly raised to the
trial court, however, plaintiff again has pointed to no
evidence in the record that surrender of the note and trust
deed to the trustee is required.

The only conceivable evidence

of this point is contained in the Request itself, which reads,
in pertinent part:
Said Note, together with all other
indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has
been fully paid and satisfied and you are
hereby requested and directed, on payment to
you of any sums owing to you under the terms
of said Trust Deed, to cancel said Note
above mentioned and all other evidences of
indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed
delivered to vou herewith, together with the
said Trust Deed and to reconvey, without
warranty to the parties designated by the
terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now
held by you thereunder in and to the
property described as follows: . . . .
See Addendum IV (emphasis added).
Relying on the emphasized language above, plaintiff
argues that Guardian was required to obtain the note and trust
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deed before reconveying.

The language of this Request,

however, imposes no legal obligations on Guardian.
simply a pre-printed form, and nothing more.

It is

Moreover, the

origin of this form is completely unknown based on the record
before this court.

There is no evidence, for example, that it

is a form customarily used by Guardian.

This document, which

is not a form prescribed by statute, has no force of law.

It

is completely ineffective to impose any legal duties on
Guardian.
Furthermore, the language of the Request does not
require surrender of the note and trust deed.

Rather, it

merely tells the trustee that, if those documents have been
delivered, the property should be reconveyed.

The Request by

its terms does not make their surrender a condition to
reconveyance.
Finally, even if the Request could be read as imposing
a requirement to tender the note and trust deed prior to
reconveyance, such a requirement would in all events run
contrary to the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33,
(1953).

That statute requires plainly that M[t]he beneficiary

under such trust deed shall deliver to the trustor or his
successor in interest the trust deed and the note or other
evidence of the obligation so satisfied." (emphasis added).
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To

the extent this form purports to alter the unambiguous
requirements of Utah Law, it clearly can impose no obligations
on the Trustee.
Plainly, the form Request constitutes no evidence that
Guardian was required to obtain surrender of the note and trust
deed before reconveying.

Yet it is the only such evidence

plaintiff has been able to point to.
Likewise, plaintiff has again cited no case law for
this proposition*

She offers no support whatever, evidentiary

or legal, for this argument.
IV.

GUARDIAN MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF BECAUSE
HER INJURY RESULTED FROM A DELIBERATE CRIMINAL ACT
WHICH GUARDIAN, AS A MATTER OF LAW, HAD NO DUTY TO
FORESEE.
A.

The Reconveyance Resulted From A Forgery
Perpetrated By An Unidentified Third Party.

Plaintiff alleges that the request for reconveyance,
apparently bearing the signature of herself and her mother, was
a forgery.

When Guardian received the allegedly forged

request, which had been properly acknowledged, Guardian
prepared and recorded a deed of reconveyance.
There is absolutely no claim or evidence in this case
that Guardian, by recording the deed of reconveyance, acted in
anything but the utmost good faith.
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Guardian assumed that the

acknowledged document was authentic.

Unfortunately, at least

according to plaintiff, it was instead a forgery.
serious crime under Utah law.

Forgery is a

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501

(1953).
B.

There Is No Duty to Foresee Criminal Acts.

It is fundamental that one of the principal yardsticks
to measure a party's duty to another is the foreseeability to
the defendant of the particular risk the plaintiff is exposed
to.

Palsoraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y.

1928); Black v. Nelson, 532 P.2d 212, 213 (Utah 1975); Prosser
and Keeton on Torts, § 43 (5th ed. 1984).
It is also hornbook law that one has no duty to
foresee the criminal misconduct of third parties.
law in Utah.

This is the

In Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977), the

plaintiff in a wrongful death action appealed from a jury
verdict in favor of defendant.

In this case, the decedent had

been a guest at a New Year's Eve party at the defendant Beehive
Elks Lodge.

During the party, he got into a fight with another

guest, Scott, at which point the lodge manager intervened and
the parties departed.

After both parties had left, the manager

was told there had been a shooting outside in the alley.
Neither the manager nor anyone else made any investigation.

(
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Later, both the decedent and Scott returned to the party, and
Scott shot and killed the decedent.
Plaintiff brought suit against Scott as well as the
lodge, asserting that the lodge, after it became aware of a
scuffle between the decedent and Scott and a shooting incident
in the alley, owed a legal duty to the decedent to take steps
to prevent the fatal shooting from occurring.
After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the
defendant lodge, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial
court had erred in giving the following instruction:
You are instructed that a private lodge or
association, as well as its officers, has no
duty to anyone to anticipate that a crime
will be committed bv another person, and to
act upon that belief.
Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument.

Even

though the lodge manager was aware of a shooting incident in
the alley, and thus the imminent risk of serious injury to
those at the party, the Court held that the foregoing
instruction properly stated Utah law:

H

[I]t was not error to

instruct that defendants had no duty to anticipate the
commission of the subject crime."
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Id. at 78 (emphasis added).

This Court has recently affirmed the principles set
forth in Gray v. Scott, in Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723,
788-9 (Utah 1985), and Godeskv v. Provo Citv Corp., 690 P.2d
541, 545 (Utah 1984), where it held that one is not liable for
the unforseeable negligence of others-

Whether another party's

negligence is foreseeable is generally a question of fact.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 221-2 (Utah
1983).

Gray v. Scott is consistent with these cases, standing

for the proposition that criminal conduct of another is
unforeseeable as a matter of law.
The rule of Gray v. Scott is consistent with the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 448 (1965), which provides as
follows:
The act of a third person in committing an
intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause6 of harm to another resulting

6

It should be noted at this point that the legal
authorities who have discussed the intervention of criminal
acts view them differently in terms of tort analysis. The
Restatement, and many courts, view an intentional tort or crime
as a "superseding cause" that breaks the chain of causation.
See, e.g., Gillot, infra p. 32, 507 F. Supp. at 457; Citizens
State Bank, infra p. 32, 609 P.2d at 676-7. Others reason that
one simply has no duty to foresee criminal conduct. See, e.g.,
Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76, 77 (Utah 1977); Chavez, infra p.
32, 595 P.2d at 1022-03. It would appear that in this case,
analysis will be facilitated by addressing the issue in terms
of duty, not under the rubric of proximate cause. See
(Footnote 6 continued)
-31-

therefrom, although the actor's negligent
conduct created a situation which afforded
an opportunity to the third person to commit
such a tort or crime, unless the actor at
the time of his negligent conduct realized
or should have realized the likelihood that
such a situation might be created, and that
a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
Numerous decisions in other jurisdictions apply this
rule, holding as a matter of law that one owes no duty to
anticipate the intentionally tortious or criminal acts of a
third party.

See, e,g,> Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority, 507 F. Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C. 1981);
Citizens State Bank v. Martin, 609 P.2d 670, 676-7 (Kansas
1980); Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School District, 595 P.2d
1017, 1022-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
C.

Guardian Owed No Legal Duty To Protect Plaintiff
From The Forgery.

The rule declared in Gray v. Scott easily disposes of
the issue before the Court.

In Gray, the defendant lodge

manager was on notice of a specific and grave risk of harm to

(Footnote 6 continued)
generally, Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services,
667 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1983); Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 43
(5th ed. 1984); Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate
Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge
and Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1.
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plaintiff and other guests.
outside his party.

There had been a shooting right

One might, in such a situation, reasonably

foresee a shooting inside the party.

Yet the Court there held

that defendant owed no duty to anticipate and protect plaintiff
from the defendant's criminal act.
The record in this case, quite to the contrary,
indicates that Guardian had no notice whatsoever of any risk
that plaintiff might be victimized by a criminal act.

Instead,

in reliance on a properly acknowledged request for
reconveyance, Guardian performed the duties imposed on it by
the Utah Code and reconveyed the trust property.

It never had

any reason to believe or suspect that the request was not
authentic.
The forgery was simply unforeseeable as a matter of
law.

As Mr. Curlis* affidavit shows, Guardian has executed

literally hundreds of deeds of reconveyance based on written
requests for reconveyance.
been a forged request.

On no other occasion has there ever

R. at 399-400.

This criminal forgery

was completely unforeseeable to Guardian; under Gray v. Scott,
Guardian owed no legal duty to protect plaintiff against it.
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D.

Plaintiff Fails to Demonstrate Why Guardian
Should have Foreseen That Plaintiff Would be the
Victim of a Forgery.
1.

The Court Should Not Consider Plaintiff's
Arguments, Which She Failed to Make Below.

On appeal, plaintiff advances two arguments why
Guardian, in this case, was under a duty to foresee and protect
plaintiff against the forgery.

As a threshold matter, Guardian

notes that these arguments were not made to the trial court.
Instead, plaintiff simply dismissed Guardian's argument that it
had no duty to protect plaintiff from the forgery as
"irrelevant."

R. at 440. Therefore, its arguments should not

be considered for the first time on this appeal.

Bundy v.

Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Franklin
Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040,
1045 (Utah 1983) .
Even if her arguments had been made below, they are
nonetheless without merit.
2.

Guardian's Role as Fiduciary Does Not
Require It to Protect Plaintiff From the
Unforeseeable.

Plaintiff first argues that this case is
distinguishable from Gray v. Scott because Gray "pertain[s] to
third-party relations, or relations to strangers, not to
relationships involving fiduciaries."
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Appellant's Brief,

p. 23.

Plaintiff fails to explain, however, why Guardian's

role as a fiduciary to plaintiff should make any difference.
Whether Guardian's duty is fiduciary in nature, or simply a
non-fiduciary duty of every man to protect others from
unreasonable risks of harm, the critical issue must still be
whether the particular harm is foreseeable.
The unequivocal holding in Gray is that one has no
duty to protect another from criminal conduct.

This is because

such conduct is unforeseeable as a matter of law.

Plaintiff

has pointed to no reason, nor is there any, why one should have
a duty to protect another from the unforeseeable merely because
they have a fiduciary relationship.

Plainly, all one can be

expected to do is protect others against risks reasonably to be
foreseen.

No one, not even fiduciaries, should be required to

guard against the unforeseeable.
Plaintiff also argues that Gray v. Scott, and the
cases following the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448, are
inapplicable here because unlike those cases, here "the forgery
preceded the [alleged] negligence of Guardian. . . . "
Appellant's Brief, p. 24.
Plaintiff correctly identifies a factual distinction
between this case and Gray v. Scott.

In Gray v. Scott and the

other cases following Section 448 of the Restatement, the
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defendant acts first, and a crime is committed later, resulting
in harm to the plaintiff.

Here, by contrast, the forgery was

committed first, and Guardian acted later, on the assumption
that the forgery was authentic.
The existence of a duty to anticipate that a crime
will be committed should not depend, however, on whether it is
a crime committed after the defendant acts or, as in this case,
a forgery which is committed before-hand.

Forgery is a crime

which, by its nature, is designed to induce action or reliance
that of necessity will take place later in time.

As such, a

forgery which occurs before the defendant acts is equally
unforeseeable to the defendant as a crime that might be
committed afterwards.

It is a crime of deception which, done

properly, cannot be detected.

One cannot reasonably

"anticipate", within the meaning of Gray v. Scott, that a
document relied upon is a forgery.
The sound policy underlying both Gray v. Scott and
Section 448 is that one should not be held accountable for
events which cannot reasonably be anticipated.

The

unforeseeable or unanticipatable event may take place before or
after the defendant acts, but the timing is truly irrelevant to
whether the particular act should have been foreseen.
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Plaintiff offers no reason why this factual distinction should
make a difference.
In sum, Guardian submits that this court's prior
holding in Gray v. Scott controls this case.

Here, as there,

Guardian had no duty to anticipate that a crime would be
committed, and to act upon that belief to protect plaintiff.
V.

PLAINTIFF'S -POLICY- ARGUMENTS DO NOT JUSTIFY
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.
Plaintiff sets forth, at Points VI and VII at the end

of her Brief, several miscellaneous arguments why the trial
court's judgment should be reversed.

Of these arguments, only

one, relating to the trustee's "exclusive control," Appellant's
Brief, p.28, was raised below.

See R. at 445.

The other

arguments should not, therefore, be considered on appeal.
Without addressing the merits of plaintiff's lone
argument which was set forth below, it is painfully evident
that it cannot possibly justify reversal of the trial court's
judgment, and a conclusion that Guardian is liable to plaintiff
as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Without citing the court to any evidence that Guardian
acted improperly, and without citing any legal precedent to
show that Guardian was required to take greater care than it

-37-

did before reconveying, plaintiff asks the court to reverse the
decision of the trial court, and hold Guardian liable as a
matter of law.
The relief sought is clearly unjustified.

First,

Guardian owed no duty to protect plaintiff from the
consequences of the alleged forgery, a deliberate criminal
act.

Even assuming such a duty was owed in the first place,

Guardian satisfied that duty as a matter of law by acting in
good faith reliance on an acknowledged document.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint against Guardian Title Company
of Utah and Warren EL Curlis should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of October 1986.
JONES, ^ L D O ,

By_i

HOLBRO^^i M C D O N O U G H

-2D"

id R.GMoney
R.(Mone
David
George W. Pratt
Attorneys for Guardian Title
Company of Utah and Warren H.
Curlis
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BETTE WYCALIS,

]
i

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,

]
i
I

Defendant.

Case No.

88766

After considering defendants Guardian Title Company and
Warren H. Curlis1 motion for summary judgment and reviewing the
affidavits

and

memoranda

presented

by

both

plaintiff

and

defendantsf the Court rules as follows:
The Court finds that, based upon the statement of both
parties, there are no material disputed facts.
Defendants, Guardian
trustee,

executed

acknowledged

a

request

deed

of

Title

and

Warren

reconveyance

(purportedly

H.

after

from plaintiff)

Curlis,

as

receiving

an

stating that

the debt had been paid and that the property could be reconveyed.
The acknowledged request was a forged document, the debt had not
been paid, and plaintiff was divested of her security interest.
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent in not contacting
plaintiff prior to the reconveyance to confirm that the debt had
in fact been paid.
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The issue is whether a trustee is entitled to rely on a
written, acknowledged request stating that the debt has been paid
and requesting

that the property

be reconveyed

or whether the

trustee has a duty to take further steps to confirm that the debt
has in fact been satisfied prior to the reconveyance.
Defendant

argues and gives authority

for the position

that he had no duty to foresee the criminal acts of another and
was entitled to rely on an acknowledged document.

Defendant's

authorities suggest thatf under Utah law and Rules of Evidence,
acknowledged

documents are accorded great weight to the extent

that they may be relied upon by judges and juries as presumptively authentic.
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent in failing
to know or take steps to know that the debt had, prior to reconveyance, been paid.

Plaintiff gives authority for the position

that a trustee will be liable when property is reconveyed without
authorization.

Apparently, none of plaintiff's cases deal with

the issue of whether

or not a trustee is negligent in relying

solely on an acknowledged request.
The Court finds that Utah cases and Rules of Evidence,
which

give

great

weight

to

acknowledged

documents,

compel

a

ruling that, in a case such as this, a trustee is not negligent
in relying on an acknowledged request to reconvey property unless
the trustee has reason to believe

(ii)

the request

is forged.

No

Page 3
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evidence has been presented to suggest that the trustee should
have

been

suspicious

of

the

document;

therefore,

defendants1

motion for summary judgment is granted.
DATED this 2(

day of October, 1985.

DAVID E. ROTH, Jud^e

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this & '

day of October, 1985,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:
Sherman C. Young
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84602
George W. Pratt
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MC DONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant Guardian Title
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Joseph Hatch
Attorney at Law
311 South State #320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Eric Hartman
Attorney at Law
2120 South 1300 East
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utafr\ 84106

PAULA CARR, Secretary
(iii)

INSTALLMENT PROMISSORY NuTE
s 6JU8.QJU&Q

l ^ Z . l„ „

For value received, I, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of

19 . . ? !

A?.TX?...^X.?^kT..?....^.?.^

EVA ROBERTSON
at .. ..3Q .SLNpr t h . .4.0.0. J a s t ^ ...Payjon / M M Utah
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND N O / 1 0 0

_

t

together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date at the rate of

jk?.™.*

annum, in lawful money of the United States, in monthly installments of t 7 5.6.52
....It?J:
19 ...8.0...,

day of each and every month beginning with the ....„?.?:.

the sum of
DOLLARS

percent per
each on the

day of ...._.?.^rL.7

and continuing until the whole thereof shall have been fully paid.

The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers of this note jointly and severally agree that if any installment is not
paid when due, that the whole of the principal sum then remaining unpaid, together with the accrued interest thereon
shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of the holder of this note, and that beginning with the date of such
default the whole of said unpaid principal shall bear interest at the rate of #K percent per annum both, before and
after judgment.
10.5

v

The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally consent to renewals and extensions at or after maturity hereof and waive presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice thereof, and agree to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee, together with all costs and expenses incurred© in the event that this note is placed in the
hands of any attorney for collection.
R &C/ASSOCIATES ,
Address ..

Ito^^&£^iXIer,general partner

Address ...95A..waXden..iii.lls...D.E.iy.e..,.
Address

S L C , UTAH
P . . 0 ^ BQX 5 Q 2

P r i c e , Utah
Address

2. -^^f^^J^^&
3.

84501

.- ^ V / ^ y - ^ 2
_
XDy u^tr*~&f
dr^S^^^t:

n?™* i $
4.

rC£r

.jLl^lQj

E B K A STThis note and the interest thereon i s secured by Di^econcTTrust
Deed aated June 26, 1980
on property located in Weber County..UtajL.
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(iv)

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

BOOK 1361

nee

r

814?

7Qx

ItUTV :±*
»EPF:

QU

>uH

JUL 15 1125 AH'60
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SECOND

Crust JBecb
THIS TRUST DEED is made this 26th day of

between

PLATTED

~ vr? ,r :ro

ENTERED

G MICROFILMED

,19 80

June

R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership

, as Trustor,

Bountiful

whose address is
(Street and Number)

Utah

(City)
(State)

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH
, as Trustee,* and

BETTE WYCALIS and EVA ROBERTSON

, as Beneficiary.
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER
'si

OF SALE, the following described property situated in

Weber

County, Utah:

o

i
<\

o
i

Beginning at a point which lies South 0 28'07" West 949.73 feet
and North 89°31,16M East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of
the Southwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°33'00M
East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South 21°03,35M
West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89o33,00" West
209.78 feet to the East Riqht-of-Way line of 1900 West Street;
thence North 0°28 , 07" East along said Riqht-of-Way line 99.42
feet to the point of beginning.
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way,
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 61 ,800.00
, payable to the order of
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof.
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the indebtedness secured hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by Trustee
hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof.
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
..R..$...C.AS^IAJK J ..^

.BY, K^^,...r^M...
Roy L.

roller

general partner

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF Salt Lake
On the 26th

day of

June

, 19 80

t

personally appeared before me

ROY L. MILLER who being duly sworn did say that he is a general partner of R & C
ASSOCIATES, a general partnership and that said instrument was sioned in behalf of
said partnership by authority, and said ROY L. MILLER acknowledged to me that he as
such general partner executed the same in the name of the partnership.

Notary Public
My Commission Expires: June 28, 1981

Residing at: Kaysville, Utah

•NOTE: Trustee roust be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings and
loan association authorized to do such business in Utah, a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.
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REQUEST TOR FULL RECnNVfYANCt

TO: GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH

(Trustee)

The undersigned is the legal owner and hclder of the Note and all other
indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed dated t^c 26th
day of June
u BoG ;
19_80 , recorded the
15th
day o f _ J u 2 L - _ ~ ^ f e ^ . - ' l9—~
' '
I3bl
, Page 7bi
recores o* £^raxiaxxixx»tx% utan, Said
Note, together wTth all otner indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been
fully paid and satisfied, and you are hereby requested and directed, or. payment
to you af any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel
said Note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured
by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together with the said Trust Deed
and to reconvey, without warranty to the parties designated by tne terms of said
Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder in and to the property
decribed as follows:
Beginning at a point which lies South 0°28 , 07 M West 949.73 feet and North
89°31 , 16" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence North 89 o 33 , 00 u East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South
21°03 , 35 u West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89 o 33'00" West 209.78
feet to the East Right-of-Way line of 1900 West Street; thence North 0°28 , 07"
East along said Right-of-Way line 99.42 feet to the point of beginning.

Dated

December 18, 1980

State of Utah
County of

}
)s$
)

On the
22
appeared before me

day of
December
19 80 , personally
B L U E WYCALIS
7J^~EVyTOBERTS0Wthe signers of the within instrument who duly
acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
t_&7n&z4g

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

q-\~$\

Residing in:

ADDENDUM IV

(vi)

ftarraY

,

U**h

Space above for Recorder's Use

JVcb nf Jlramimjimcc
(Corporate Trustee)
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH
under a Trust Deed dated

, as Trustee

June 2 5 ,

, 19 BO

, executed by
, as Trustor,

R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership
and recorded

July 15,

, 19 80

in Book 1361 ,

, as Entry No. 814866

Page(s) 761 of the records of the County Recorder of
Weber
County. Utah,
pursuant to a written request of the Beneficiary thereunder, does hereby reconvey, without warranty,
to the person or persons entitled thereto, the trust property now held by it as Trustee under said
Trust Deed, which Trust Dead covers real property situated in

County,

Weber

Utah, described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point which l i e s South 0°28*07n West 949.73 feet and North
e9°31 , 16" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence North 89°33'00" East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal;
thence South 21°03'35" West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89°
33*00" West 209.78 feet to the'East Right of Way line of 1900 West Street
thence North 0°28,0714 East along said Right of Way line 99.42 feet to the
point of beginning.

Dated this 26 th

day of

December

,19 80
QUARPI^..JITLE^

Bv Ms'O-^——^V * GU^'U
WARREN H".' OMAS'Tresideni
Trustee
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF Salt Lake
On the 26 th

day of

, 19 80

December

WARREN H . CURLIS
PRESIDENT

, personally appeared before me

, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the
of

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH

a corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of it*
by-laws (or by a resolution of its board of directors) and said

WARREN H . CURLIS
J

acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same.

/

i
I

^^,Z..:<^.l./S,....L.i,..„^...
^>'
My Commission Expires: 6-28-81

'

Residing at:
ADDENDUM V
(vii)

Notary Public
K a y s v i l i e , Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of October,
1986, I caused four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondents Guardian Title Company of Utah and Warren H. Curlis
in Case No. 860172 to be mailed, postage prepaid to:
Dallas H. Young, Jr.
Sherman C. Young
IVIE AND YOUNG
48 North University
Provo, Utah 84603
Joseph E, Hatch
GARRETT AND STURDY
311 South State, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Eric P. Hartman
SAMUEL KING & ASSOCIATES
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
^
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